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Observations on the past provide some hints about what will happen in the future, and this
can be quantified using information theory. The “predictive information” defined in this way has
connections to measures of complexity that have been proposed both in the study of dynamical
systems and in mathematical statistics. In particular, the predictive information diverges when the
observed data stream allows us to learn an increasingly precise model for the dynamics that generate
the data, and the structure of this divergence measures the complexity of the model. We argue that
divergent contributions to the predictive information provide the only measure of complexity or
richness that is consistent with certain plausible requirements.
There is obvious interest in having practical algorithms
for predicting the future, and there is a correspond-
ingly large literature on the problem of time series ex-
trapolation [1]. But prediction is more (and less) than
extrapolation—we might be able to predict, for example,
the chance of rain in the coming week even if we cannot
extrapolate the trajectory of temperature fluctuations.
In the spirit of its thermodynamic origins, information
theory [2] characterizes the potentialities and limitations
of all possible prediction algorithms, as well as unifying
the analysis of extrapolation with the more general no-
tion of predictability. Specifically, we define a quantity—
the predictive information—that measures how much our
observations of the past can tell us about the future. The
predictive information characterizes the world we are ob-
serving, and we shall see that this characterization is close
to our intuition about the complexity of the underlying
dynamics.
Imagine that we observe a stream of data over the pe-
riod from t = −T to t = 0; this constitutes our past. For
simplicity, let the future extend forward also for a time T .
Let us call the data we observe during the pastXpast, and
the data we will observe in the future Xfuture. The usual
problem is to guess the values of Xfuture from knowledge
of Xpast, but this is too specific; only certain features of
the data stream are predictable, and even these features
may be predictable only in a statistical sense. Different
kinds of prediction are often treated as different prob-
lems, and when we assess the quality of these predictions
we seem forced to use different metrics in the different
cases. Information theory allows us to treat the different
notions of prediction on the same footing.
Even before we look at the data, we already know that
certain futures are more likely then others, and we can
summarize this knowledge by a ‘prior’ probability distri-
bution for the future, P (Xfuture). Our observations on
the past lead us to a new, more tightly concentrated dis-
tribution, the distribution of futures conditional on the
past data, P (Xfuture|Xpast). Different kinds of predic-
tions can be seen as different slices through or averages
over this conditional distribution. The greater concen-
tration of the conditional distribution can be quantified
directly by the fact that it has a smaller entropy than the
prior distribution, and this reduction in entropy is Shan-
non’s definition of the information that the past provides
about the future [2]. We can write the average of this
predictive information as
Ipred(T ) =
〈
log2
[
P (Xfuture, Xpast)
P (Xfuture)P (Xpast)
]〉
(1)
= −〈log2 P (Xfuture)〉 − 〈log2 P (Xpast)〉
− [−〈log2 P (Xfuture, Xpast)〉] . (2)
Each of the terms in Eq. (2) is an entropy. If we have in-
variance under time translations, then the entropy of the
past data depends only on the duration of our observa-
tions, so we can write −〈log2 P (Xpast)〉 = S(T ), and by
the same argument −〈log2 P (Xfuture)〉 = S(T ). Finally,
the entropy of the past and future taken together is the
entropy of observations on a window of duration 2T , so
that −〈log2 P (Xfuture, Xpast)〉 = S(2T ). Putting these
equations together we obtain the basic relation between
predictability and the time dependence of the entropy,
Ipred(T ) = 2S(T )− S(2T ). (3)
The entropy is an extensive quantity, so that
limT→∞ S(T )/T = S. In the same way that the entropy
of a gas at fixed density is proportional to the volume, the
entropy of a time series is (asymptotically) proportional
to its duration. This entropy is also the minimum num-
ber of bits required to give a complete description of the
past data. But from Eq. (3) any extensive component
of the entropy cancels in the computation of the predic-
tive information: predictability is associated with devi-
ation of the entropy from extensivity. The cancellation
of extensive components means that the predictive infor-
mation must be subextensive, limT→∞ Ipred(T )/T = 0.
As a result, of the total information we have taken in by
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observing Xpast, only a vanishing fraction is of relevance
to predicting the future:
lim
T→∞
Predictive Information
Total Information
=
Ipred(T )
S(T )
→ 0. (4)
In this precise sense, most of what we observe is irrelevant
to the problem of predicting the future.
Qualitatively, we expect the predictive information to
behave in one of three ways for large values of the time T .
One possibility is that, no matter how long we observe,
we learn only a finite amount of information about the
future, so that limT→∞ Ipred(T ) = constant. This sit-
uation prevails when even the best possible predictions
are controlled only by the immediate past, so that the
correlation times of the observable data are finite. Al-
ternatively, the predictive information can be small be-
cause the dynamics are too regular: for a purely periodic
system, complete prediction is possible once we know
the phase, and if we sample the data at discrete times
this a finite amount of information; longer period or-
bits are intuitively more complex and also have larger
Ipred. In physical systems we know that there are crit-
ical points where correlation times become infinite, so
that optimal predictions will be influenced by events in
the arbitrarily distant past. Under these conditions the
predictive information can grow without bound as T be-
comes large; for many systems the divergence is logarith-
mic, Ipred(T → ∞) ∼ µ lnT . Finally it is possible that
Ipred(T →∞) ∝ T
α.
Imagine that we observe x(t) at a series of discrete
times {tn}, and that each time point we find the value
xn. Then we can always write the joint distribution of
the N data points as a product,
P (x1, x2, · · · , xN ) = P (x1)P (x2|x1)P (x3|x2, x1) · · · . (5)
For Markov processes, what we observe at tn depends
only on events at the previous time step tn−1, so that
P (xn|{x1≤i≤n−1}) = P (xn|xn−1), (6)
and hence the predictive information reduces to
Ipred =
〈
ln
[
P (xn|xn−1)
P (xn)
]〉
. (7)
The maximum possible predictive information is the en-
tropy of the distribution of states at one time step, which
in turn is bounded by the logarithm of the number of ac-
cessible states. To approach this bound the system must
maintain memory for a long time, since the predictive
information is reduced by the entropy of the transition
probabilities. Thus systems with more states and longer
memories have larger values of Ipred.
Consider next a time series of pairs (x1, y1), (x2, y2),
· · ·, (xN , yN). The points xn are chosen independently
and at random from some P (x), while the yn are noisy
examples of a function f(x), yn = f(xn)+ηn, with the ηn
chosen, for instance, from a Gaussian distribution. Let us
assume that the function f(x) can be written as sum of
K basis functions φ1(x), φ2(x), · · · , φK(x) with unknown
coefficients αµ. Then the joint distribution of {xn, yn} is
given by
P ({xn, yn}) =
[
N∏
n=1
P (xn)
]
1
(2pi〈η2〉)N/2
×
∫
dKαP ({αµ}) exp(−χ
2/2), (8)
χ2 =
1
〈η2〉
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣∣∣yn −
K∑
µ=1
αµφµ(xn)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (9)
In the limit N → ∞ the integral over the parameters
αµ can be done in a saddle point approximation [3,4],
and in this approximation the entropy of the distribu-
tion P ({xn, yn}) has an extensive term proportional to
N but also a leading subextensive term ∼ (K/2) lnN .
The result is the same for a broad class of time series
in which the data are described by K parameter models
with unknown parameters [4]: the predictive information
is Ipred = (K/2) lnN and is equal to the information that
the data provide about underlying dynamical model.
Rather than being described by a finite number of pa-
rameters, it is possible that the functional relations em-
bedded in the data {xn, yn} reflect an arbitrary smooth
function [5]. As we observe more of the time series we
expect to give a more and more sophisticated description
of this underlying function, in effect allowing the number
of parameters in our description to increase with time.
This suggests that the predictive information, which is
proportional to the number of parameters in the finitely
parameterizable case, will grow more rapidly with N in
the nonparametric setting [4]. Similarly, when we exam-
ine written texts on the scale of tens of letters, we learn
about the rules for combining letters into words, but if we
look at hundreds of letters we also learn about the rules
for combining words into phrases, and so on: longer texts
teach us about an increasing number of different things,
rather than giving us more precise knowledge about a
fixed number of rules or parameters. Statistical analy-
ses of long texts suggest that their entropy has a large
subextensive component, and that this component—and
hence the predictive information—is best fit by a power
law, so that Ipred ∝ N
1/2 for N letter texts [6]. This
result agrees with a recent reanalysis [7] of Shannon’s
classic experiments on the prediction of English texts by
human observers [8].
The divergence of the predictive information has an
interesting consequence. The average amount of infor-
mation we have about the current state of a signal is
(asymptotically) independent of how long we have been
watching. On the other hand, if we live in a world such
that signals have diverging predictive information then
the space required to write down our description grows
and grows as we observe the world for longer peirods of
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time. In particular, if we can observe for a very long time
then the amount that we know about the future will ex-
ceed, by an arbitrarily large factor, the amount that we
know about the present [9].
The examples considered here suggest that the pre-
dictive information corresponds to our intuitive notion
of complexity in the incoming data stream: Ipred distin-
guishes processes that can be described by a finite num-
ber of parameters from those that cannot, and within
each class counts the number of parameters or dimen-
sions that are relevant. The problem of quantifying com-
plexity is very old [10]. There are two major motivations.
First, we would like to make precise our impression that
some systems—such as life on earth or a turbulent fluid
flow—evolve toward a state of higher complexity. Sec-
ond, in choosing among different models that describe
an experiment, we want to quantify our preference for
simpler explanations or, equivalently, provide a penalty
for complex models that can be weighed against the more
conventional ‘goodness of fit’ criteria.
The construction of complexity penalties for model se-
lection is a statistics problem. In this context, Rissanen
has emphasized that fitting a model to data represents
an encoding of those data, and that in searching for an
efficient code we need to measure not only the number
of bits required to describe the deviations of the data
from the model’s predictions (goodness of fit), but also
the number of bits required to specify the parameters
of the model, which he terms the stochastic complexity
[11]. For models with a finite number of parameters, the
stochastic complexity is proportional to the number of
parameters and logarithmically dependent on the num-
ber of data points we have observed, as found here for
the predictive information. The connection of stochastic
complexity to statistical mechanics ideas has also been
noted by Balasubramanian [3].
The essential difficulty in constructing complexity
measures for physical systems is to distinguish genuine
complexity from randomness (entropy). Several authors
have considered complexity measures related to the mu-
tual information between spatially distant points, but
this is problematic [12]. Lloyd and Pagels [13] identi-
fied complexity (thermodynamic depth) with the entropy
of the state sequences that lead to the current state,
an idea which is clearly in the same spirit as the mea-
surement of predictive information, but this depth mea-
sure does not completely discard the extensive compo-
nent of the entropy. Grassberger has emphasized that
the slow approach of the entropy to its extensive limit is
a sign of complexity, and has proposed a function, the
effective measure complexity, that isolates this term in a
form almost equivalent to the predictive information [14].
Crutchfield and Young [15] have argued that the effective
measure complexity is also related to number of states in
the minimal finite state machine that would simulate the
dynamics of the data stream. For low dimensional dy-
namical systems, the effective measure complexity and
hence the predictive information is finite whether the
system exhibits periodic or chaotic behavior, but at the
bifurcation point that marks the onset of chaos the pre-
dictive information diverges logarithmically. Simulations
of specific cellular automaton models that are capable
of universal computation indicate that these systems ex-
hibit a power law divergence of Ipred [14].
We recall that entropy provides a measure of informa-
tion that is unique in satisfying certain plausible con-
straints [2]. It would be attractive if we could prove a
similar uniqueness theorem for the predictive informa-
tion as a measure of the complexity or richness of a time
dependent signal x(0 < t < T ) drawn from a distribu-
tion P [x(t)]. As in Shannon’s approach, such a measure
must obey some constraints: if there are N equally likely
signals, then the measure should be monotonic in N ; if
the signal is decomposable into statistically independent
parts then the measure should be additive with respect
to this decomposition; and if the signal can be described
as a leaf on a tree of statistically independent decisions
then the measure should be a weighted sum of the mea-
sures at each branching point. For discrete signals these
criteria specify the entropy of the distribution P [x(t)] as
a unique measure, but in the case of continuous signals
there are ambiguities. We would like to write the contin-
uum generalization of the entropy,
Scont = −
∫
Dx(t)P [x(t)] log2 P [x(t)], (10)
but this is not well defined because we are taking the
logarithm of a dimensionful quantity. Shannon gave the
solution to this problem: we use as a measure of informa-
tion the relative entropy between the distribution P [x(t)]
and some reference distribution Q[x(t)],
Srel = −
∫
Dx(t)P [x(t)] log2
(
P [x(t)]
Q[x(t)]
)
, (11)
which is invariant under changes of our coordinate system
on the space of signals. The cost of this invariance is that
we have introduced an arbitrary distribution Q[x(t)], and
so we really have a family of measures. We suggest that,
within this family, the appropriate measure of complexity
is one which obeys further invariance principles.
The reference distribution Q[x(t)] embodies our expec-
tations for the signal x(t); in particular, Srel measures
the extra space needed to encode signals drawn from the
distribution P [x(t)] if we use coding strategies that are
optimized for Q[x(t)]. If x(t) is a written text, two read-
ers who expect different numbers of spelling errors will
have different Qs, but to the extent that spelling errors
can be corrected by reference to the immediate neighbor-
ing letters we insist that any measure of complexity be
invariant to these differences in Q. On the other hand,
readers who differ in their expectations about the global
subject of the text may well disagree about the richness
of a newspaper article. This suggests that complexity is a
component of the relative entropy that is invariant under
some class of ‘local translations and misspellings.’
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Suppose that we leave aside global expectations, and
construct our reference distribution Q[x(t)] by allowing
only for short ranged interactions—certain letters tend
to follow one another, letters form words, and so on, but
we bound the range over which these rules are applied.
Models of this class cannot embody the full structure
of most interesting time series (including language), but
in the present context we are not asking for this. On
the contrary, we are looking for a measure that is invari-
ant to differences in this short ranged structure. In the
terminology of field theory or statistical mechanics, we
are constructing our reference distribution Q[x(t)] from
local operators. Because we are considering a one di-
mensional signal (the one dimension being time), dis-
tributions constructed from local operators cannot have
any phase transitions as a function of parameters, and
the absence of critical points means that the entropy of
these distributions (or their contribution to the relative
entropy) consists of an extensive term (proportional to
the time window T ) plus a constant subextensive term,
plus terms that vanish as T becomes large. Thus, if we
choose different reference distributions within the class
constructible from local operators, we can change the ex-
tensive component of the relative entropy, and we can
change constant subextensive terms, but the divergent
subextensive terms are invariant.
To summarize, the usual constraints on information
measures in the continuum produce a family of allowable
measures, the relative entropy to an arbitrary reference
distribution. If we insist that all observers who choose
reference distributions constructed from local operators
arrive at the same measure of complexity, then this mea-
sure must be the divergent subextensive component of
the entropy. As emphasized above, the predictive in-
formation is the subextensive component of the entropy.
Thus, if we accept the invariance principle as a supple-
ment to Shannon’s original postulates, the unique mea-
sure of complexity or richness of a signal is the divergent
component of the predictive information. We have seen
that this component is connected to learning, quantify-
ing the amount that can be learned about dynamics that
generate the signal, and to measures of complexity that
have arisen in statistics and dynamical systems theory.
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